Coalition governments and comparative constitutional design

Daniel Diermeier, Hülya Eraslan, Antonio Merlo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    In this paper we present a structural approach to the study of government formation in multi-party parliamentary democracies. The approach is based on the estimation of a stochastic bargaining model which we use to investigate the effects of specific institutional features of parliamentary democracy on the formation and dissolution of coalition governments. We illustrate our methodology by presenting the results of two (counterfactual) experiments of comparative constitutional design.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)893-907
    Number of pages15
    JournalEuropean Economic Review
    Issue number4-5
    StatePublished - 2002


    • Bicameralism
    • Constitutions
    • Government dissolution
    • Government formation
    • Minority coalitions
    • Political stability

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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