Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution

Nguyen Tran; Jinyang Li; Lakshminarayanan Subramanian

doi:10.1145/1879082.1879085

Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution

Nguyen Tran, Jinyang Li, Lakshminarayanan Subramanian

Computer Science

Research output: Contribution to conference › Paper › peer-review

Abstract

With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of "official" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.

Original language	English (US)
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085
State	Published - 2010
Event	2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10 - Vancouver, BC, Canada Duration: Oct 3 2010 → Oct 3 2010

Other

Other	2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10
Country/Territory	Canada
City	Vancouver, BC
Period	10/3/10 → 10/3/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computational Theory and Mathematics
Computer Networks and Communications

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10.1145/1879082.1879085

Cite this

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author = "Nguyen Tran and Jinyang Li and Lakshminarayanan Subramanian",

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doi = "10.1145/1879082.1879085",

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note = "2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10 ; Conference date: 03-10-2010 Through 03-10-2010",

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AU - Tran, Nguyen

AU - Li, Jinyang

AU - Subramanian, Lakshminarayanan

PY - 2010

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N2 - With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of "official" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.

AB - With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of "official" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.

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Y2 - 3 October 2010 through 3 October 2010

ER -

Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution

Abstract

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

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