Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

With growing demand for high-quality multimedia content, content providers face enormous pressure to scale the serving capacity. Peer-to-peer content distribution is a natural low cost option to scale system capacity. In a P2P CDN model, content providers serve content using a small number of "official" seeder nodes and rely on participating users to act as individual seeders for others in the system. Although P2P CDNs have the potential to drastically reduce the required serving capacity of official seeders, they must address the challenge of incentivizing users to stay online in the P2P network and act as seeders.

Original languageEnglish (US)
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: Oct 3 2010Oct 3 2010

Other

Other2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10
CountryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period10/3/1010/3/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computer Networks and Communications

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this

    Tran, N., Li, J., & Subramanian, L. (2010). Collusion-resilient credit-based reputations for peer-to-peer content distribution. Paper presented at 2010 Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation, NetEcon '10, Vancouver, BC, Canada. https://doi.org/10.1145/1879082.1879085