TY - JOUR
T1 - Communication in Action
T2 - Planning and Interpreting Communicative Demonstrations
AU - Ho, Mark K.
AU - Cushman, Fiery
AU - Littman, Michael L.
AU - Austerweil, Joseph L.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2021. American Psychological Association
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others’ behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer’s mental representations. Our framework extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators’ actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the sociocognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality.
AB - Theory of mind enables an observer to interpret others’ behavior in terms of unobservable beliefs, desires, intentions, feelings, and expectations about the world. This also empowers the person whose behavior is being observed: By intelligently modifying her actions, she can influence the mental representations that an observer ascribes to her, and by extension, what the observer comes to believe about the world. That is, she can engage in intentionally communicative demonstrations. Here, we develop a computational account of generating and interpreting communicative demonstrations by explicitly distinguishing between two interacting types of planning. Typically, instrumental planning aims to control states of the environment, whereas belief-directed planning aims to influence an observer’s mental representations. Our framework extends existing formal models of pragmatics and pedagogy to the setting of value-guided decision-making, captures how people modify their intentional behavior to show what they know about the reward or causal structure of an environment, and helps explain data on infant and child imitation in terms of literal versus pragmatic interpretation of adult demonstrators’ actions. Additionally, our analysis of belief-directed intentionality and mentalizing sheds light on the sociocognitive mechanisms that underlie distinctly human forms of communication, culture, and sociality.
KW - Communication
KW - Planning
KW - Pragmatics
KW - Problem solving
KW - Social learning
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85120765208&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85120765208&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1037/xge0001035
DO - 10.1037/xge0001035
M3 - Article
C2 - 34498911
AN - SCOPUS:85120765208
SN - 0096-3445
VL - 150
SP - 2246
EP - 2272
JO - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
JF - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
IS - 11
ER -