Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information

Alberto Bisin, Piero Gottardi

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    This paper studies competitive equilibria in economies where agents trade in markets for standardized, non-exclusive financial contracts, under conditions of asymmetric information (both of the moral hazard and the adverse selection type). The problems for the existence of competitive equilibria in this framework are identified, and shown to be essentially the same under different forms of asymmetric information. We then show that a "minimal" form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread, requiring only the possibility to separate buyers and sellers), and the condition that the aggregate return on the individual positions in each contract can be perfectly hedged in the existing markets, ensure the existence of competitive equilibria in the case of both adverse selection and moral hazard. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, D82.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1-48
    Number of pages48
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume87
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 1999

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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