Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study

Andrew Kloosterman; Andrew Schotter

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study

Andrew Kloosterman, Andrew Schotter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	186-205
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	99
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001
State	Published - Sep 1 2016

Keywords

Dynamic games
Economic development
Institutions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

Cite this

@article{c509380465c74ca4a87d057019e0ce7b,

title = "Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study",

abstract = "This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.",

keywords = "Dynamic games, Economic development, Institutions",

author = "Andrew Kloosterman and Andrew Schotter",

year = "2016",

month = sep,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "99",

pages = "186--205",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Complementary institutions and economic development

T2 - An experimental study

AU - Kloosterman, Andrew

AU - Schotter, Andrew

PY - 2016/9/1

Y1 - 2016/9/1

N2 - This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

AB - This paper considers the problem of why societies develop differently, a question most recently articulated by Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). We follow North (1990) in defining institutions as the “rules of the game in society.” The question then becomes why do some societies develop functional institutions while others do not? To investigate this question, we develop and examine a specific type of dynamic game (which we call an Institutional Game). Our point is that complementarities among the choices that all societies make as they develop can help to answer this question.

KW - Dynamic games

KW - Economic development

KW - Institutions

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84985995877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84985995877&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2016.08.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84985995877

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 99

SP - 186

EP - 205

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

ER -

Complementary institutions and economic development: An experimental study

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this