TY - JOUR
T1 - Computing a Strategic Decarbonization Pathway
T2 - A Chance-Constrained Equilibrium Problem
AU - Kim, Jip
AU - Mieth, Robert
AU - Dvorkin, Yury
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received February 19, 2020; revised October 1, 2020; accepted November 8, 2020. Date of publication November 17, 2020; date of current version April 19, 2021. This work was supported in part by U.S. NSF under Grant CMMI-1 825 212 and in part by Alfred P. Sloan Foundation under Grant 9084. Paper no. TPWRS-00 265-2020. (Corresponding author: Yury Dvorkin.) The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tandon School of Engineering, New York University, New York, NY 11 201 USA (e-mail: jipkim@nyu.edu; robert.mieth@ieee.org; dvorkin@nyu.edu).
Publisher Copyright:
© 1969-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2021/5
Y1 - 2021/5
N2 - US transmission systems and wholesale electricity markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC), which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CC-EPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory competition in the ISO New England system.
AB - US transmission systems and wholesale electricity markets, albeit federally regulated, often span across multiple state jurisdictions. In this environment, state regulators can strategically exploit this techno-economic coupling to advance their clean energy policy goals at the expense of neighboring jurisdictions. This paper investigates strategic regulatory competition to understand its effect on achieving Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). We formulate a chance-constrained equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (CC-EPEC), which considers multiple state regulators, acting in coordination with in-state power companies, to implement RPS goals in the least-cost manner. To solve this CC-EPEC, we customize a Progressive Hedging (PH) algorithm. The case study uses the CC-EPEC and PH algorithm to analyze the effects of state regulatory competition in the ISO New England system.
KW - Decarbonization
KW - equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints
KW - progressive hedging
KW - regulatory competition
KW - renewable portfolio standard
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U2 - 10.1109/TPWRS.2020.3038840
DO - 10.1109/TPWRS.2020.3038840
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85097157396
VL - 36
SP - 1910
EP - 1921
JO - IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
SN - 0885-8950
IS - 3
M1 - 9261976
ER -