Computing bayes-nash equilibria in combinatorial auctions with verification

Vitor Bosshard, Benedikt Bunz, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We present a new algorithm for computing pure-strategy "-Bayes-Nash equilibria ("-BNEs) in combinatorial auctions with continuous value and action spaces. An essential innovation of our algorithm is to separate the algorithm's search phase (for finding the "-BNE) from the verification phase (for computing the "). Using this approach, we obtain an algorithm that is both very fast and provides theoretical guarantees on the "it finds. Our main technical contribution is a verification method which allows us to upper bound the "across the whole continuous value space without making assumptions about the mechanism. Using our algorithm, we can now compute "-BNEs in multi-minded domains that are significantly more complex than what was previously possible to solve. We release our code under an open-source license to enable researchers to perform algorithmic analyses of auctions, to enable bidders to analyze different strategies, and to facilitate many other applications.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)531-570
Number of pages40
JournalJournal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Volume69
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 23 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence

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