Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk

Sylvain Chassang, Gerard PadŕO I. Miquel

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1821-1858
    Number of pages38
    JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
    Issue number4
    StatePublished - Nov 2010

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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