CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR MANIPULATION ECONOMIES

Alex Citanna; Paolo Siconolfi

doi:10.1111/iere.12465

CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR MANIPULATION ECONOMIES

Alex Citanna, Paolo Siconolfi

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We design a competitive market for exclusive contracts in large economies with observable types where trades are subject to postcontractual manipulations. We do not impose quantity restrictions at the trading stage—for example, incentive constraints on the consumption or production sets. We establish existence and constrained optimality of equilibrium. Our design can accommodate manipulations stemming from private information as well as from behavioral biases—for example, time inconsistency and false beliefs. We discuss the needed size and complexity of the commodity set.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1531-1567
Number of pages	37
Journal	International Economic Review
Volume	61
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12465
State	Published - Nov 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/iere.12465

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author = "Alex Citanna and Paolo Siconolfi",

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CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT MARKETS FOR MANIPULATION ECONOMIES

Abstract

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