Constrained egalitarian allocations

Bhaskar Dutta, Debraj Ray

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    This paper proposes a constrained egalitarian solution concept for TU games which combines commitment for egalitarianism and promotion of individual interests in a consistent manner. The paper shows that the set of constrained egalitarian allocations is nonempty for weakly super-additive games. The solution is "almost" unique if the desirability relation between players is complete.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)403-422
    Number of pages20
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume3
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 1991

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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