Contagion and observability in security domains

Yoram Bachrach, Moez Draief, Sanjeev Goyal

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We examine security domains where defenders choose their security levels in the face of a possible attack by an adversary who attempts to destroy as many of them as possible. Though the attacker only selects one target, and only has a certain probability of destroying it depending on that defender's security level, a successful attack may infect other defenders. By choosing a higher security level the defenders increase their probability of survival, but incur a higher cost of security. We assume that the adversary observes the security levels chosen by the defenders before selecting whom to attack. We show that under this assumption the defenders over-protect themselves, exhausting all their surplus, so optimal policy requires taxing security, as opposed to the subsidies recommended by alternative models for contagious attacks which do not take into account the attacker's ability to observe the defenders' choices.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages1364-1371
Number of pages8
ISBN (Print)9781479934096
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Event51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 2 2013Oct 4 2013

Publication series

Name2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013

Other

Other51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period10/2/1310/4/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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