TY - JOUR
T1 - Contingent prize allocation and pivotal voting
AU - Smith, Alastair
AU - Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce
PY - 2012/4
Y1 - 2012/4
N2 - Parties can elitcit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which party wins, a voter's choice also influences the distribution of prizes. This latter factor, referred to in this article as prize pivotalness, tends to be the dominant influence in vote choice. The desire to win prizes can induce voters to coalesce into a highly supportive group, even if they dislike the party's policies. Characterizing voting equilibria in this framework explains the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups in both established and new democracies.
AB - Parties can elitcit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which party wins, a voter's choice also influences the distribution of prizes. This latter factor, referred to in this article as prize pivotalness, tends to be the dominant influence in vote choice. The desire to win prizes can induce voters to coalesce into a highly supportive group, even if they dislike the party's policies. Characterizing voting equilibria in this framework explains the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups in both established and new democracies.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84863287838&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84863287838&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/S0007123411000342
DO - 10.1017/S0007123411000342
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84863287838
SN - 0007-1234
VL - 42
SP - 371
EP - 392
JO - British Journal of Political Science
JF - British Journal of Political Science
IS - 2
ER -