TY - GEN

T1 - Cooperation and coordination in the turn-taking Dilemma

AU - Neill, Daniel B.

PY - 2003/6/20

Y1 - 2003/6/20

N2 - In many real-world situations, "cooperation" in the simple sense of the Prisoner's Dilemma is not sufficient for success: instead, cooperators must precisely coordinate more complex behaviors in a noisy environment. We investigate one such model, the Turn-Taking Dilemma, a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the highest total payoff is achieved not by simultaneous mutual cooperation, but by taking turns defecting (alternating temptation and sucker payoffs). The Turn-Taking Dilemma more accurately models interactions where players must take short-term losses for long-term gains: situations marked by the intricate give-and-take of bargaining and compromise. Using "evolutionary dominance" as a general measure of performance, we investigated which strategies are most successful in Turn-Taking Dilemma interactions. Our experiments demonstrate that turn-taking can be achieved in a noisy environment, even when agents have strict resource constraints (limited memory strategies). Top strategies such as EX ALT2 can effectively coordinate turn-taking under noise, while exploiting cooperators and resisting exploitation by defectors; these strategies are likely to achieve success in the variety of real-world interactions modeled by the Turn-Taking Dilemma.

AB - In many real-world situations, "cooperation" in the simple sense of the Prisoner's Dilemma is not sufficient for success: instead, cooperators must precisely coordinate more complex behaviors in a noisy environment. We investigate one such model, the Turn-Taking Dilemma, a variant of the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma in which the highest total payoff is achieved not by simultaneous mutual cooperation, but by taking turns defecting (alternating temptation and sucker payoffs). The Turn-Taking Dilemma more accurately models interactions where players must take short-term losses for long-term gains: situations marked by the intricate give-and-take of bargaining and compromise. Using "evolutionary dominance" as a general measure of performance, we investigated which strategies are most successful in Turn-Taking Dilemma interactions. Our experiments demonstrate that turn-taking can be achieved in a noisy environment, even when agents have strict resource constraints (limited memory strategies). Top strategies such as EX ALT2 can effectively coordinate turn-taking under noise, while exploiting cooperators and resisting exploitation by defectors; these strategies are likely to achieve success in the variety of real-world interactions modeled by the Turn-Taking Dilemma.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=77955262873&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=77955262873&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1145/846241.846270

DO - 10.1145/846241.846270

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:77955262873

T3 - Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

SP - 231

EP - 244

BT - Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

A2 - Tennenholtz, Moshe

PB - Association for Computing Machinery, Inc

T2 - 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

Y2 - 20 June 2003 through 22 June 2003

ER -