Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: Little agreement, but does that matter?

Walter Bossert, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solutions within a common framework, such unification seems unlikely since they are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)185-202
    Number of pages18
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Aug 2002


    • Core
    • Nash equilibrium
    • Truel

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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