Abstract
It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, over one round or n rounds. Representative solution concepts (Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium; two notions of core) are compared, and little agreement is found among them. Although it might be desirable to subsume these different solutions within a common framework, such unification seems unlikely since they are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 185-202 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 40 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 2002 |
Keywords
- Core
- Nash equilibrium
- Truel
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics