Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

Aurelie Dariel; Nikos Nikiforakis

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.033

Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	163-166
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	122
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.033
State	Published - Feb 2014

Keywords

Gift-exchange game
Lab experiments
Public-good game
Social preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.033

Cite this

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title = "Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior",

abstract = "We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.",

keywords = "Gift-exchange game, Lab experiments, Public-good game, Social preferences",

author = "Aurelie Dariel and Nikos Nikiforakis",

note = "Funding Information: Financial support from the Swiss National Fund (grant: 100014-126954 ) is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Steffen Altmann, Jim Andreoni, Mariana Blanco, Olivier Bochet, Hans Normann and Arno Riedl for useful comments; we also wish to thank Simon Siegenthaler for help with running the experiments. ",

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N2 - We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.

AB - We perform a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior in the public-good and gift-exchange game. We find that participants classified as cooperators in the public-good game tend to reciprocate higher wages in the gift-exchange game with higher levels of effort. Non-cooperators do not exhibit such tendency. Both types offer similar wages. •We present a within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior.•Subjects play a public-good and a gift-exchange game.•Cooperators reciprocate higher wages, but not non-cooperators.

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KW - Lab experiments

KW - Public-good game

KW - Social preferences

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Cooperators and reciprocators: A within-subject analysis of pro-social behavior

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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