Correlated evolutionarily stable strategies in random medium access control

Hamidou Tembine, Eitan Altman, Rachid ElAzouzi, Yezekael Hayel

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In this paper we study a dynamic multiple access in distributed wireless networks with random number of users. We apply evolutionary game theoretic analysis to solve several problems: (a) We address the stability of Aloha-like systems with finitely many power levels. Specifically, we consider very large number of receivers distributed in several locations. Each of them receives packets from random number of users accessing the resource using Aloha-like algorithms. We provide an explicit expression for equilibria, correlated evolutionarily stable strategies, and prove some asymptotic stability results. (b) We apply correlation mechanism and evaluate the performance of random medium access when saturated users interact through interference. We introduce the benefit of correlation (BoC) to measure the gap between the probability of success at correlated evolutionarily stable strategies and the worst probability of success of evolutionarily stable strategies. We show that if only two power levels are available, the correlation mechanism reduces considerably the interference and the number of collisions. Moreover, the correlation mechanism is stable in long-term under several classes of bio-inspired evolutionary game dynamics. (c) Surprisingly, when the number of strategies is at least three, the correlation mechanisms do not improve the probability of success.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
Pages212-221
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2009
Event2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 - Istanbul, Turkey
Duration: May 13 2009May 15 2009

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09

Other

Other2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09
CountryTurkey
CityIstanbul
Period5/13/095/15/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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    Tembine, H., Altman, E., ElAzouzi, R., & Hayel, Y. (2009). Correlated evolutionarily stable strategies in random medium access control. In Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09 (pp. 212-221). [5137404] (Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets '09). https://doi.org/10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137404