Costly concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility

Alfred Galichon, Scott Duke Kominers, Simon Weber

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We introduce an empirical framework for models of matching with imperfectly transferable utility and unobserved heterogeneity in tastes. Our framework allows us to characterize matching equilibrium in a flexible way that includes as special cases fully and nontransferable utility models, collective models, and settings with taxes on transfers. We allow for the introduction of a general class of additive unobserved heterogeneity on agents’ preferences. We show existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium under minimal assumptions. We provide two algorithms to compute the equilibrium in our model. We then show that the associated log likelihood has a simple expression and compute its derivatives. An empirical illustration is provided in the appendix.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)2875-2925
    Number of pages51
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume127
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Dec 1 2019

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Costly concessions: An empirical framework for matching with imperfectly transferable utility'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this