TY - JOUR
T1 - Coupled-Space Attacks Against Random-Walk-Based Anomaly Detection
AU - Lai, Yuni
AU - Waniek, Marcin
AU - Li, Liying
AU - Wu, Jingwen
AU - Zhu, Yulin
AU - Michalak, Tomasz P.
AU - Rahwan, Talal
AU - Zhou, Kai
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2005-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - Random Walks-based Anomaly Detection (RWAD) is commonly used to identify anomalous patterns in various applications. An intriguing characteristic of RWAD is that the input graph can either be pre-existing graphs or feature-derived graphs constructed from raw features. Consequently, there are two potential attack surfaces against RWAD: graph-space attacks and feature-space attacks. In this paper, we explore this vulnerability by designing practical coupled-space (interdependent feature-space and graph-space) attacks, investigating the interplay between graph-space and feature-space attacks. To this end, we conduct a thorough complexity analysis, proving that attacking RWAD is NP-hard. Then, we proceed to formulate the graph-space attack as a bi-level optimization problem and propose two strategies to solve it: alternative iteration (alterI-attack) or utilizing the closed-form solution of the random walk model (cf-attack). Finally, we utilize the results from the graph-space attacks as guidance to design more powerful feature-space attacks (i.e., graph-guided attacks). Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed attacks are effective in enabling the target nodes to evade the detection from RWAD with a limited attack budget. In addition, we conduct transfer attack experiments in a black-box setting, which show that our feature attack significantly decreases the anomaly scores of target nodes. Our study opens the door to studying the coupled-space attack against graph anomaly detection in which the graph space relies on the feature space.
AB - Random Walks-based Anomaly Detection (RWAD) is commonly used to identify anomalous patterns in various applications. An intriguing characteristic of RWAD is that the input graph can either be pre-existing graphs or feature-derived graphs constructed from raw features. Consequently, there are two potential attack surfaces against RWAD: graph-space attacks and feature-space attacks. In this paper, we explore this vulnerability by designing practical coupled-space (interdependent feature-space and graph-space) attacks, investigating the interplay between graph-space and feature-space attacks. To this end, we conduct a thorough complexity analysis, proving that attacking RWAD is NP-hard. Then, we proceed to formulate the graph-space attack as a bi-level optimization problem and propose two strategies to solve it: alternative iteration (alterI-attack) or utilizing the closed-form solution of the random walk model (cf-attack). Finally, we utilize the results from the graph-space attacks as guidance to design more powerful feature-space attacks (i.e., graph-guided attacks). Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed attacks are effective in enabling the target nodes to evade the detection from RWAD with a limited attack budget. In addition, we conduct transfer attack experiments in a black-box setting, which show that our feature attack significantly decreases the anomaly scores of target nodes. Our study opens the door to studying the coupled-space attack against graph anomaly detection in which the graph space relies on the feature space.
KW - Graph-based anomaly detection
KW - adversarial attacks
KW - poisoning attack
KW - random walk
KW - security and privacy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85204973193&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85204973193&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/TIFS.2024.3468156
DO - 10.1109/TIFS.2024.3468156
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85204973193
SN - 1556-6013
VL - 19
SP - 9315
EP - 9329
JO - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
JF - IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
ER -