Credible coalitions and the core

D. Ray

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A problem with the concept of the core is that it does not explicitly capture the credibility of blocking coalitions. This notion is defined, and the concept of a modified core introduced, consisting of allocations not blocked by any credible coalition. The core and modified core are then shown to be identical. The concept of credibility is thus implicit in the definition of the core.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)185-187
    Number of pages3
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Volume18
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 1989

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics and Probability
    • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
    • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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