CrowdSensing games

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Crowd sensing pertains to the monitoring of large-scale phenomena that cannot be easily measured by a single individual. For example, intelligent transportation systems may require traffic congestion monitoring and air pollution level monitoring. These phenomena can be measured accurately only when many individuals provide speed and air quality information from their daily commutes, which are then aggregated spatio-temporally to determine congestion and pollution levels in smart cities. In this paper we study three classes of a network game where each user decides its level of participation to the crowdsensing: (i) public good, (ii) information sharing, (iii) resource sharing. We examine the contribution level of users via Bayesian game models, where we have analyzed the equilibrium strategies, equilibrium payoff and the role of user-centric information on their behavior in terms of participation to the cloud. We also analyzed the possibility for users with power-hungry devices to serve the cloud by means of throughput sharing strategies from other users.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages4660-4665
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509046560
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 12 2017
Event29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017 - Chongqing, China
Duration: May 28 2017May 30 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017

Other

Other29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017
CountryChina
CityChongqing
Period5/28/175/30/17

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Keywords

  • Crowd sourcing
  • Crowdsensing
  • Game theory
  • Public good

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Control and Optimization

Cite this

Tembine, H. (2017). CrowdSensing games. In Proceedings of the 29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017 (pp. 4660-4665). [7979320] (Proceedings of the 29th Chinese Control and Decision Conference, CCDC 2017). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CCDC.2017.7979320