Cryptographic vote-stealing attacks against a partially homomorphic e-voting architecture

Nektarios Georgios Tsoutsos, Michail Maniatakos

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Electronic voting plays an increasingly important role in the democratic process in the US and other countries. As technology continues to advance, the security and privacy requirements of contemporary voting platforms become even more strict, and several voting protocols have been proposed. At the same time, homomorphic encryption offers powerful primitives that allow provable guarantees of security. In this paper, we analyze the security of a partially homomorphic electronic voting architecture and describe a vote-stealing attack by exploiting a length-extension vulnerability in the message authentication component of the system. Our attack scales with the public key parameters of the homomorphic encryption scheme and does not require any exhaustive search for secret keys or initialization vectors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 34th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages157-160
Number of pages4
ISBN (Electronic)9781509051427
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 22 2016
Event34th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2016 - Scottsdale, United States
Duration: Oct 2 2016Oct 5 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 34th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2016

Other

Other34th IEEE International Conference on Computer Design, ICCD 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityScottsdale
Period10/2/1610/5/16

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture

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