Cyber-attack on a power plant using bias injected measurements

Efstathios Kontouras, Anthony Tzes, Leonidas Dritsas

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

This paper addresses the concept of a bias injection cyber-attack on the load frequency control loop of a single-area power plant. The system operates in islanded mode and evolves in the discrete-time domain. A convex and compact set of polyhedral state constraints represents a valid domain of safe operation under the effect of a stabilizing output-feedback dynamic controller. An alarm is triggered whenever the safety constraints are violated, alerting the control center to a potential system intrusion. An attacker succeeds in gaining access to the frequency sensor measurements and corrupts the data transferred to the automatic generation control unit, driving the electrical frequency to a safety-critical steady-state value without triggering an alarm. Simulation studies highlight the effect of the cyber-attack on the physical plant.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2017 American Control Conference, ACC 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages5507-5512
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509059928
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 29 2017
Event2017 American Control Conference, ACC 2017 - Seattle, United States
Duration: May 24 2017May 26 2017

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2017 American Control Conference, ACC 2017
CountryUnited States
CitySeattle
Period5/24/175/26/17

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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