TY - JOUR
T1 - Decentralized trading, strategic behaviour and the walrasian outcome
AU - Rubinstein, Ariel
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgement. We would like to thank J.-P. Benassy, K. Binmore, and A. Shaked for helpful comments. Wolinsky's research has been supported by the NSF through Grant No. SES-8810053.
PY - 1990/1
Y1 - 1990/1
N2 - For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching and bargaining, it is shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time, the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. If agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it, there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events.
AB - For a market with a finite number of agents, pairwise matching and bargaining, it is shown that, even when the market is frictionless, the equilibrium is not necessarily competitive. It depends on the amount of information agents use. If their behaviour is conditioned only on the sets of agents present and the time, the competitive solution is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium. If agents have full information and condition their behaviour on some of it, there are also noncompetitive equilibria in which behaviour depends on specific information such as the identity of the trading partner and past events.
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U2 - 10.2307/2297543
DO - 10.2307/2297543
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84959793812
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 57
SP - 63
EP - 78
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
IS - 1
ER -