Deceptive routing in relay networks

Andrew Clark; Quanyan Zhu; Radha Poovendran; Tamer Başar

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10

Deceptive routing in relay networks

Andrew Clark, Quanyan Zhu, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Başar

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network traffic. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for selfish and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings
Pages	171-185
Number of pages	15
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10
State	Published - 2012
Event	3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012 - Budapest, Hungary Duration: Nov 5 2012 → Nov 6 2012

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	7638 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012
Country/Territory	Hungary
City	Budapest
Period	11/5/12 → 11/6/12

Keywords

Game Theory
Jamming and Security
Relay Networks
Routing Algorithms
Stackelberg Equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10

Cite this

Clark, A., Zhu, Q., Poovendran, R., & Başar, T. (2012). Deceptive routing in relay networks. In Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings (pp. 171-185). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7638 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10

Deceptive routing in relay networks. / Clark, Andrew; Zhu, Quanyan; Poovendran, Radha et al.
Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings. 2012. p. 171-185 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 7638 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Clark, A, Zhu, Q, Poovendran, R & Başar, T 2012, Deceptive routing in relay networks. in Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 7638 LNCS, pp. 171-185, 3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, 11/5/12. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10

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abstract = "Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network traffic. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for selfish and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.",

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AU - Poovendran, Radha

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AB - Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network traffic. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for selfish and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.

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Deceptive routing in relay networks

Abstract

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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