Deceptive routing in relay networks

Andrew Clark, Quanyan Zhu, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network traffic. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for selfish and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings
Pages171-185
Number of pages15
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012 - Budapest, Hungary
Duration: Nov 5 2012Nov 6 2012

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume7638 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Other

Other3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012
CountryHungary
CityBudapest
Period11/5/1211/6/12

Keywords

  • Game Theory
  • Jamming and Security
  • Relay Networks
  • Routing Algorithms
  • Stackelberg Equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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