@inproceedings{6c5e8867a1874a699dc41743e325cf12,
title = "Deceptive routing in relay networks",
abstract = "Physical-layer and MAC-layer defense mechanisms against jamming attacks are often inherently reactive to experienced delay and loss of throughput after being attacked. In this paper, we study a proactive defense mechanism against jamming in multi-hop relay networks, in which one or more network sources introduce a deceptive network flow along a disjoint routing path. The deceptive mechanism leverages strategic jamming behaviors, causing the attacker to expend resources on targeting deceptive flows and thereby reducing the impact on real network traffic. We use a two-stage game model to obtain deception strategies at Stackelberg equilibrium for selfish and altruistic nodes. The equilibrium solutions are illustrated and corroborated through a simulation study.",
keywords = "Game Theory, Jamming and Security, Relay Networks, Routing Algorithms, Stackelberg Equilibrium",
author = "Andrew Clark and Quanyan Zhu and Radha Poovendran and Tamer Ba{\c s}ar",
year = "2012",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0_10",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9783642342653",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
pages = "171--185",
booktitle = "Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Proceedings",
note = "3rd International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2012 ; Conference date: 05-11-2012 Through 06-11-2012",
}