Delay aversion

Jean Pierre Benoît; Efe A. Ok

Delay aversion

Jean Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is demonstrated in a variety of dynamic economic settings, including the classical optimal growth and tree cutting Problems, repteated games, and bargaining. Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent scenarios are considered.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	71-113
Number of pages	43
Journal	Theoretical Economics
Volume	2
Issue number	1
State	Published - Mar 2007

Keywords

Consumption smoothing
Delay aversion
Impatience
Time consistency

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Cite this

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KW - Time consistency

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Delay aversion

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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