Delayed privatization

Bernardo Bortolotti, Paolo Pinotti

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)331-351
Number of pages21
JournalPublic Choice
Volume136
Issue number3-4
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2008

Keywords

  • Political economy
  • Privatization
  • War of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Economics and Econometrics

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