Delayed privatization

Bernardo Bortolotti; Paolo Pinotti

doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5

Delayed privatization

Bernardo Bortolotti, Paolo Pinotti

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	331-351
Number of pages	21
Journal	Public Choice
Volume	136
Issue number	3-4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5
State	Published - Sep 2008

Keywords

Political economy
Privatization
War of attrition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5

Cite this

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title = "Delayed privatization",

abstract = "This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.",

keywords = "Political economy, Privatization, War of attrition",

author = "Bernardo Bortolotti and Paolo Pinotti",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgements We wish to thank Utpal Bhattacharya, Antonio Ciccone, Luca Farinola, Arendt Lijphart, Bill Megginson, Marco Pagano, David Parker, Enrico Perotti, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Alessandro Sembenelli, Guido Tabellini, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the World Bank, 2003 EEA meeting, WZB, Berlin, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei and CERGE-EI for useful comments. Ettore Panetti and Valentina Milella provided excellent research assistance. This research has been supported by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan and by the European Commission (contract n. HPSE-CT-1990-00007). The usual disclaimer applies.",

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doi = "10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5",

language = "English (US)",

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AU - Pinotti, Paolo

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PY - 2008/9

Y1 - 2008/9

N2 - This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.

AB - This paper studies the timing of privatization in 21 major developed economies in the 1977-2002 period. Duration analysis shows that political fragmentation plays a significant role in explaining government's decision to privatize: privatization is delayed longer in democracies characterized by a larger number of parties and operating under proportional electoral rules, as predicted by war of attrition models of economic reform. Results are robust to various assumptions on the underlying statistical model and to controlling for other economic and political factors.

KW - Political economy

KW - Privatization

KW - War of attrition

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DO - 10.1007/s11127-008-9299-5

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JO - Public Choice

JF - Public Choice

IS - 3-4

ER -

Delayed privatization

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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