Democracy, the Market, and the Firm: How the Interplay between Trading and Voting Fosters Political Stability and Economic Efficiency

This book is an attempt to resolve an enigma that has puzzled social scientists since Condorcet in the eighteenth century: Why are collective choices so stable and easy to make in practice, when in theory it should be totally otherwise? A striking illustration of this enigma is the almost unanimous support of shareholders in publicly traded companies for the motions tabled by directors. The first part of the book explores the interplay between the voting and trading mechanisms. Two main arguments are proposed: on the one hand, the better the market works, the easier it is for majority voting to achieve political stability; on the other hand, among all market equilibria, those that are politically stable are more likely to be economically efficient. The second part of the book explores the feedback from collective choices to individual preferences. It investigates the behavioral assumptions leading to an alignment of shareholders, even in a context of severe market failures, and provides an analysis of the philosophical and axiomatic underpinnings of these assumptions. In sum, and figuratively, the book argues that the invisible hand of the market and the active hand of democracy can work hand in hand to give rise to a better world. The analysis relies on formal models which are kept as simple as possible and make use only of elementary convex and vector analysis.