Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization

Anthony M. Bertelli, J. Andrew Sinclair

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Governments face different incentives when they reorganize many administrative agencies at one time rather than making infrequent, case-by-case changes. This article develops a theory of mass administrative reorganizations, which posits that the politics of reorganization is focused on government accountability. Viewing mass reorganization as a structured decision, it argues that choices about independence, agency organization and functional disposition have different impacts on the political costs of administrative policy making. Analyzing novel data from a recent British reorganization with sequential logistic statistical models provides substantial support for these claims. The study challenges the focus on organizational survival in the existing literature. By eschewing more fundamental political questions of democratic accountability, the prevailing approach masks essential politics, and in the context of this study, all influence of conflict due to party and agency policy positions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)691-711
Number of pages21
JournalBritish Journal of Political Science
Volume48
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Democratic Accountability and the Politics of Mass Administrative Reorganization'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this