Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics

Muhammet A. Bas

doi:10.1177/0022002712445737

Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics

Muhammet A. Bas

Political Science

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This article examines the relationship between regime type and decision makers' tendency to make suboptimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on the optimality of democratic foreign policy, the author uses a novel statistical measure of suboptimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino's statistical strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999 shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal for their citizens than do nondemocratic leaders.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	799-824
Number of pages	26
Journal	Journal of Conflict Resolution
Volume	56
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445737
State	Published - Oct 2012

Keywords

heteroskedasticity
interstate conflict
strategic models
suboptimal choices

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Business, Management and Accounting
Sociology and Political Science
Political Science and International Relations

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10.1177/0022002712445737

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abstract = "This article examines the relationship between regime type and decision makers' tendency to make suboptimal choices in international crises. To test hypotheses on the optimality of democratic foreign policy, the author uses a novel statistical measure of suboptimality in foreign policy behavior. This estimator builds on Signorino's statistical strategic models to allow for actor-level variation in deviations from optimal behavior in a strategic setting. An analysis of the international disputes from 1919 to 1999 shows that democratic leaders have a greater tendency to choose policies not optimal for their citizens than do nondemocratic leaders.",

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Democratic Inefficiency? Regime Type and Suboptimal Choices in International Politics

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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