Direct Democracy, Constitutional Reform, and Political Inequality in Post-Colonial America

Mario Chacón, Jeffrey Jensen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The ratification of constitutional changes via referendum is an important mechanism for constraining the influence of elites, particularly when representative institutions are captured. While this electoral device is commonly employed cross-nationally, its use is far from universal. We investigate the uneven adoption of mandatory referendums by examining the divergence between Northern and Southern U.S. states in the post-independence period. We first explore why states in both regions adopted constitutional conventions as the primary mechanism for making revisions to fundamental law, but why only Northern states adopted the additional requirement of ratifying via referendum. We argue that due to distortions in state-level representation, Southern elites adopted the discretionary referendum as a mechanism to bypass the statewide electorate when issues divided voters along slave-dependency lines. We demonstrate the link between biases to apportionment and opposition to mandatory referendums using a novel data set of roll calls from various Southern state conventions, including during the secession crisis of 1861.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)148-169
Number of pages22
JournalStudies in American Political Development
Volume34
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2020

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Sociology and Political Science

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