TY - JOUR
T1 - Discordant Knowing
T2 - A Social Cognitive Structure Underlying Fanaticism
AU - Gollwitzer, Anton
AU - Okten, Irmak Olcaysoy
AU - Pizarro, Angel Osorio
AU - Oettingen, Gabriele
N1 - Funding Information:
Funding was provided by Gerry Ohrstrom and the John Templeton Foundation
Publisher Copyright:
© 2022 American Psychological Association
PY - 2022/5/19
Y1 - 2022/5/19
N2 - Examining the epistemic and social–cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing—felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed bymost others—underlies fanaticism. Acrossmultifaceted approaches, experimentallymanipulating participants’ views to fall under this framework (e.g., “I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong”) heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1–7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9).
AB - Examining the epistemic and social–cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing—felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed bymost others—underlies fanaticism. Acrossmultifaceted approaches, experimentallymanipulating participants’ views to fall under this framework (e.g., “I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong”) heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1–7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9).
KW - Discordant knowing
KW - Epistemology
KW - Extremism
KW - Fanaticism
KW - Social cognition
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U2 - 10.1037/xge0001219
DO - 10.1037/xge0001219
M3 - Article
C2 - 35587419
AN - SCOPUS:85129121335
SN - 0096-3445
VL - 151
SP - 2846
EP - 2878
JO - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
JF - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
IS - 11
ER -