Abstract
We characterize security strategies and payoffs for three mechanisms for dissolving partnerships: the Texas Shoot-Out, the K+ 1 auction, and the compensation auction. A security strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff, and represents a natural starting point for analysis when a participant is either uncertain of the environment or uncertain of whether his rivals will play equilibrium. For the compensation auction, a dynamic dissolution mechanism, we introduce the notion of a perfect security strategy. Such a strategy maximizes a participant’s minimum payoff along every path of play. We show that while a player has many security strategies in the compensation auction, he has a unique perfect security strategy.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 415-434 |
Number of pages | 20 |
Journal | Economic Theory |
Volume | 69 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 1 2020 |
Keywords
- Auction
- Maximin
- Partnerships
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics