Does the content and mode of delivery of information matter for electoral accountability? Evidence from a field experiment in Mexico

Evidence that information campaigns help citizens elect better politicians is mixed. We investigate whether comparative performance information and public dissemination can enhance information’s effects on electoral accountability, by respectively helping citizens to identify malfeasance by incumbent parties and facilitating coordination around the information provided. We test these mechanisms using a large-scale field experiment that provided citizens with the results of audit reports documenting mayoral malfeasance before the 2015 Mexican municipal elections. Although citizens used incumbent performance indicators to hold governments to account, we find that neither benchmarking incumbent performance against mayors from other parties within the state, nor accompanying leaflet delivery with loudspeakers announcing the leaflets’ delivery, significantly moderated the effects of information on citizen beliefs or incumbent party vote share. Comparative performance information’s ineffectiveness likely reflected citizens’ limited updating from the particular comparison provided, while the loudspeaker generated somewhat greater common knowledge without meaningfully facilitating voter coordination. The results highlight challenges in designing informational campaigns to capture the theoretical conditions conducive to electoral accountability.