Does unbundling policy authority improve accountability?

Dimitri Landa, Patrick Le Bihan

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We develop a model to analyze the effects of complexity of policy areas on the desirability of bundling or unbundling policymaking authority. We find that bundling tends to increase political accountability when the complexities of bundled policy areas are sufficiently symmetric and decrease it when the complexities are sufficiently asymmetric. When bundling is beneficial, its advantage comes from the possibility of sustaining in equilibrium a mechanism that makes greater investment into policy in multiple issue areas a form of insurance purchase for the officeholder. The appeal of such insurance purchases and the edge they give to bundling persist in the presence of the possibility of policy capture by special interests, upending the conventional wisdom.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)933-947
    Number of pages15
    JournalJournal of Politics
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Jul 1 2018

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science


    Dive into the research topics of 'Does unbundling policy authority improve accountability?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this