TY - JOUR
T1 - Domestic Political Sources of American Monetary Policy
T2 - 1955–82
AU - Beck, Nathaniel
N1 - Funding Information:
* Versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1983 and the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1981. I would like to thank Profs. James Alt, Stanley Black, Peter Gourevitch, Gary Jacobson, David Laitin, Thomas Mayer, Terry Moe, Thomas Willett, and John Woolley for their comments. Computer funds were provided by the Committee on Research of the University of California, San Diego. Other funds were provided by the National Science Foundation, under Grant SES 82-07491.
PY - 1984/8
Y1 - 1984/8
N2 - This study investigates what domestic political factors affect monetary policy in the United States. Monetary policy is measured by changes in adjusted bank reserves. A reaction function is estimated using quarterly data for 1955–82. Independent economic variables in the reaction function are current and expected inflation, slackness, international reserves, the balance of payments, and the high employment surplus. Political variables examined are elections, party, administration, and the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. Elections do not affect Fed policy. Monetary policy is easier under Democratic presidents; the Kennedy and Nixon administrations do not fit this general pattern. The effect of party and administration is linear; neither party nor administration affects the relationship between the state of the economy and Fed policy. Monetary and fiscal policy covaried during the 1960s; by the 1970s easy fiscal and tight monetary policy became more common.
AB - This study investigates what domestic political factors affect monetary policy in the United States. Monetary policy is measured by changes in adjusted bank reserves. A reaction function is estimated using quarterly data for 1955–82. Independent economic variables in the reaction function are current and expected inflation, slackness, international reserves, the balance of payments, and the high employment surplus. Political variables examined are elections, party, administration, and the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy. Elections do not affect Fed policy. Monetary policy is easier under Democratic presidents; the Kennedy and Nixon administrations do not fit this general pattern. The effect of party and administration is linear; neither party nor administration affects the relationship between the state of the economy and Fed policy. Monetary and fiscal policy covaried during the 1960s; by the 1970s easy fiscal and tight monetary policy became more common.
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U2 - 10.2307/2130856
DO - 10.2307/2130856
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84959692059
SN - 0022-3816
VL - 46
SP - 786
EP - 817
JO - The Journal of Politics
JF - The Journal of Politics
IS - 3
ER -