Double deception: Two against one in three-person games

Steven J. Bra, Frank C. Zagare

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    This article examines deception possibilities for two players in simple three-person voting games. An example of one game vulnerable to (tacit) deception by two players is given and its implications discussed. The most unexpected findings of this study is that in those games vulnerable to deception by two players, the optimal strategy of one of them is always to announce his (true) preference order. Moreover, since the player whose optimal announcement is his true one is unable to induce a better outcome for himself by misrepresenting his preference, while his partner can, this player will find that possessing a monopoly of information will not give him any special advantage. In fact, this analysis demonstrates that he may have incentives to share his information selectively with one or another of his opponents should he alone possess complete information at the outset.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)81-90
    Number of pages10
    JournalTheory and Decision: An International Journal for Multidisciplinary Advances in Decision Science
    Volume13
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 1981

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Decision Sciences(all)
    • Developmental and Educational Psychology
    • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
    • Applied Psychology
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • Computer Science Applications

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