Abstract
This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is also examined. In particular, we show that Cournot competition may increase the inefficiency of organizational practices.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 223-239 |
Number of pages | 17 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 1995 |
Keywords
- Coordination games
- Incentive schemes
- Organizational slack
- Signalling
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management