Dynamic coordination failures and the efficiency of the firm

Sanjeev Goyal, Maarten C.W. Janssen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper examines the role of coordination devices such as work norms in creating and sustaining inefficient organizational practices in firms, in a dynamic environment. The role of signalling norms and product market competition in alleviating such inefficiencies is also examined. In particular, we show that Cournot competition may increase the inefficiency of organizational practices.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)223-239
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Issue number2
StatePublished - Oct 1995


  • Coordination games
  • Incentive schemes
  • Organizational slack
  • Signalling

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management


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