Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress

Hye Young You

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    How do interest groups decide which member of Congress to target when decisions are made collectively? Do lobbying strategies change as legislation advances? Answering these questions is challenging due to a lack of systematic observations of lobbying contacts. I answer these questions using a novel data set constructed from reports submitted by lobbyists on behalf of South Korea regarding its free trade agreement with the United States for 10 years. I show that a diverse set of politicians are contacted but the timing, intensity, and strategy of lobbying contacts vary by politicians' institutional positions as well as their predisposed preferences for free trade.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)445-469
    Number of pages25
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - Jul 2023


    • U.S. congress
    • foreign lobbying
    • free trade agreement
    • persuasion

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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