TY - GEN
T1 - Dynamics of Strategic Protection Against Virus Propagation in Heterogeneous Complex Networks
AU - Hayel, Yezekael
AU - Zhu, Quanyan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, Springer International Publishing AG.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - With an increasing number of wide-spreading cyber-attacks on networks such as the recent WannaCry and Petya Ransomware, protection against malware and virus spreading in large scale networks is essential to provide security to network systems. In this paper, we consider a network protection game in which heterogeneous agents decide their individual protection levels against virus propagation over complex networks. Each agent has his own private type which characterizes his recovery rate, transmission capabilities, and perceived cost. We propose an evolutionary Poisson game framework to model the heterogeneous interactions of the agents over a complex network and analyze the equilibrium strategies for decentralized protection. We show the structural results of the equilibrium strategies and their connections with replicator dynamics. Numerical results are used to corroborate the analytical results.
AB - With an increasing number of wide-spreading cyber-attacks on networks such as the recent WannaCry and Petya Ransomware, protection against malware and virus spreading in large scale networks is essential to provide security to network systems. In this paper, we consider a network protection game in which heterogeneous agents decide their individual protection levels against virus propagation over complex networks. Each agent has his own private type which characterizes his recovery rate, transmission capabilities, and perceived cost. We propose an evolutionary Poisson game framework to model the heterogeneous interactions of the agents over a complex network and analyze the equilibrium strategies for decentralized protection. We show the structural results of the equilibrium strategies and their connections with replicator dynamics. Numerical results are used to corroborate the analytical results.
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_27
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-68711-7_27
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85032866853
SN - 9783319687100
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 506
EP - 518
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 8th International Conference, GameSec 2017, Proceedings
A2 - Kiekintveld, Christopher
A2 - Schauer, Stefan
A2 - An, Bo
A2 - Rass, Stefan
A2 - Fang, Fei
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 8th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2017
Y2 - 23 October 2017 through 25 October 2017
ER -