Jean Jacques Laffont, Isabelle Perrigne, Michel Simioni, Quang Vuong

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


    This chapter develops a structural framework for the analysis of scoring procurement auctions where bidder’s quality and bid are taken into account. With exogenous quality, the authors characterize the optimal mechanism whether the buyer is private or public and show that the optimal scoring rule need not be linear in the bid. The model primitives include the buyer benefit function, the bidders’ cost inefficiencies distribution and cost function, and potentially the cost of public funds. We show that the model primitives are nonparametrically identified under mild functional assumptions from the buyer’s choice, firms’ bids and qualities. The authors then develop a multistep kernel-based procedure to estimate the model primitives and provide their convergence rates. Our identification and estimation results are general as they apply to other scoring rules including quasi-linear ones.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationAdvances in Econometrics
    PublisherEmerald Group Holdings Ltd.
    Number of pages36
    StatePublished - 2020

    Publication series

    NameAdvances in Econometrics
    ISSN (Print)0731-9053


    • Cost efficiency
    • Identification
    • Nonparametric estimation
    • Procurement
    • Quality
    • Scoring auctions

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


    Dive into the research topics of 'ECONOMETRICS OF SCORING AUCTIONS'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this