TY - JOUR
T1 - Education finance reform and investment in human capital
T2 - Lessons from California
AU - Fernández, Raquel
AU - Rogerson, Richard
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Kevin Lang, Jonathan Portes, Jim Poterba, Ed Prescott, Mark Schweitzer and two anonymous referees for comments as well as seminar participants at CUNY, University of Pennsylvania, University of Texas, Pennsylvania State, Bank of Canada, Queen’s University, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and conference participants at the Inequality Conference in Spain, the AEA meetings, and the NBER. Both authors gratefully acknowledge NSF support and the first author thanks the C.V. Starr Center for financial support as well.
PY - 1999/12
Y1 - 1999/12
N2 - This paper examines the effect of different education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public education. We focus on California, which in the 1970's was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state finance and subsequently saw its funding of public education fall between 10 and 15% relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public education would also have dropped by almost 10%.
AB - This paper examines the effect of different education financing systems on the level and distribution of resources devoted to public education. We focus on California, which in the 1970's was transformed from a foundation system of mixed local and state financing to one of effectively pure state finance and subsequently saw its funding of public education fall between 10 and 15% relative to the rest of the US. We show that a simple political economy model of public finance can account for the bulk of this drop. We find that while the distribution of spending became more equal, this was mainly at the cost of a large reduction in spending in the wealthier communities with little increase for the poorer districts. Our calibrated model implies that there is no simple trade-off between equity and resources; we show that if California had moved to the opposite extreme and abolished state aid altogether, funding for public education would also have dropped by almost 10%.
KW - California
KW - Education finance reform
KW - Human capital
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U2 - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00046-8
DO - 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00046-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0033472917
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 74
SP - 327
EP - 350
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
IS - 3
ER -