TY - JOUR
T1 - Education, matching, and the allocative value of Romance
AU - Booth, Alison
AU - Coles, Melvyn
PY - 2010/6
Y1 - 2010/6
N2 - Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms-one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. Whereas marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching, by increasing the number of educated and talented women who participate in the labour market, increases aggregate productivity. (JEL: I21, J12, J16, J41).
AB - Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partnerships. We explore how such customs affect the educational investment decisions of young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We consider two separate matching paradigms-one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt. Whereas marrying for money generates greater investment efficiency, romantic matching, by increasing the number of educated and talented women who participate in the labour market, increases aggregate productivity. (JEL: I21, J12, J16, J41).
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U2 - 10.1162/jeea_a_00003
DO - 10.1162/jeea_a_00003
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77953510477
SN - 1542-4766
VL - 8
SP - 744
EP - 775
JO - Journal of the European Economic Association
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
IS - 4
ER -