TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficiency, equity and timing of voting mechanisms
AU - Battaglini, Marco
AU - Morton, Rebecca
AU - Palfrey, Thomas
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2007/8
Y1 - 2007/8
N2 - We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games. We find a tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs.
AB - We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test using controlled laboratory experiments. Most of the qualitative predictions are supported by the data, but there are significant departures from the predicted equilibrium strategies, in both the sequential and the simultaneous voting games. We find a tradeoff between information aggregation, efficiency, and equity in sequential voting: a sequential voting rule aggregates information better than simultaneous voting and is more efficient in some information environments, but sequential voting is inequitable because early voters bear more participation costs.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0003055407070281
DO - 10.1017/S0003055407070281
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:34547404239
VL - 101
SP - 409
EP - 424
JO - American Political Science Review
JF - American Political Science Review
SN - 0003-0554
IS - 3
ER -