Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkiliç, Hervé Moulin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers.Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)535-562
Number of pages28
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume148
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2013

Keywords

  • Bipartite graph
  • Egalitarianism
  • Lorenz dominance
  • Single-peaked preferences
  • Strategyproofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Egalitarianism under earmark constraints'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this