Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Olivier Bochet; Rahmi Ilkiliç; Hervé Moulin

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016

Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkiliç, Hervé Moulin

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers.Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	535-562
Number of pages	28
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016
State	Published - Mar 2013

Keywords

Bipartite graph
Egalitarianism
Lorenz dominance
Single-peaked preferences
Strategyproofness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016

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title = "Egalitarianism under earmark constraints",

abstract = "Agents with single-peaked preferences share a resource coming from different suppliers; each agent is connected to only a subset of suppliers. Examples include workload balancing, sharing earmarked funds, and rationing utilities after a storm.Unlike in the one supplier model, in a Pareto optimal allocation agents who get more than their peak from underdemanded suppliers, coexist with agents who get less from overdemanded suppliers.Our Egalitarian solution is the Lorenz dominant Pareto optimal allocation. It treats agents with equal demands as equally as the connectivity constraints allow. Together, Strategyproofness, Pareto Optimality, and Equal Treatment of Equals, characterize our solution.",

keywords = "Bipartite graph, Egalitarianism, Lorenz dominance, Single-peaked preferences, Strategyproofness",

author = "Olivier Bochet and Rahmi Ilkili{\c c} and Herv{\'e} Moulin",

note = "Funding Information: Acknowledgments: The authors warmly thank Anna Bogomolnaia, Jeremy Laurent-Lucchetti, and Jay Sethuraman for stimulating discussions, as well as two referees and the associate editor whose comments and insights greatly helped improve this paper. Olivier Bochetʼs research is supported by the Swiss National Fund (SNF) under grant 100014-126954 . Part of the research was completed when Rahmi İlkılı{\c c} was affiliated with Maastricht University and he acknowledges the support of the European Community via Marie Curie Grant PIEF-GA-2008-220181 . Herv{\'e} Moulinʼs research was supported by MOVE at the Universitat Aut{\`o}noma de Barcelona . ",

year = "2013",

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doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.016",

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AU - Bochet, Olivier

AU - Ilkiliç, Rahmi

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Egalitarianism under earmark constraints

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Keywords

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