Electrical vehicles in the smart grid: A mean field game analysis

Romain Couillet; Samir M. Perlaza; Hamidou Tembine; Mérouane Debbah

doi:10.1109/JSAC.2012.120707

Electrical vehicles in the smart grid: A mean field game analysis

Romain Couillet, Samir M. Perlaza, Hamidou Tembine, Mérouane Debbah

Electrical Engineering

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In this article, we investigate the competitive interaction between electrical vehicles or hybrid oil-electricity vehicles in a Cournot market consisting of electricity transactions to or from an underlying electricity distribution network. We provide a mean field game formulation for this competition, and introduce the set of fundamental differential equations ruling the behavior of the vehicles at the feedback Nash equilibrium, referred here to as the mean field equilibrium. This framework allows for a consistent analysis of the evolution of the price of electricity as well as of the instantaneous electricity demand in the power grid. Simulations precisely quantify those parameters and suggest that significant reduction of the daily electricity peak demand can be achieved by appropriate electricity pricing.

Original language	English (US)
Article number	6194233
Pages (from-to)	1086-1096
Number of pages	11
Journal	IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume	30
Issue number	6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/JSAC.2012.120707
State	Published - 2012

Keywords

Electrical Vehicles
Game Theory
Mean Field Equilibrium
Smart Grids
large populations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Networks and Communications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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10.1109/JSAC.2012.120707

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abstract = "In this article, we investigate the competitive interaction between electrical vehicles or hybrid oil-electricity vehicles in a Cournot market consisting of electricity transactions to or from an underlying electricity distribution network. We provide a mean field game formulation for this competition, and introduce the set of fundamental differential equations ruling the behavior of the vehicles at the feedback Nash equilibrium, referred here to as the mean field equilibrium. This framework allows for a consistent analysis of the evolution of the price of electricity as well as of the instantaneous electricity demand in the power grid. Simulations precisely quantify those parameters and suggest that significant reduction of the daily electricity peak demand can be achieved by appropriate electricity pricing.",

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AB - In this article, we investigate the competitive interaction between electrical vehicles or hybrid oil-electricity vehicles in a Cournot market consisting of electricity transactions to or from an underlying electricity distribution network. We provide a mean field game formulation for this competition, and introduce the set of fundamental differential equations ruling the behavior of the vehicles at the feedback Nash equilibrium, referred here to as the mean field equilibrium. This framework allows for a consistent analysis of the evolution of the price of electricity as well as of the instantaneous electricity demand in the power grid. Simulations precisely quantify those parameters and suggest that significant reduction of the daily electricity peak demand can be achieved by appropriate electricity pricing.

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Electrical vehicles in the smart grid: A mean field game analysis

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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