TY - GEN
T1 - End-to-End Encrypted Zoom Meetings
T2 - 42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Eurocrypt 2023
AU - Dodis, Yevgeniy
AU - Jost, Daniel
AU - Kesavan, Balachandar
AU - Marcedone, Antonio
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023, International Association for Cryptologic Research.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In May 2020, Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom) announced a multi-step plan to comprehensively support end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) group video calls and subsequently rolled out basic E2EE support to customers in October 2020. In this work we provide the first formal security analysis of Zoom’s E2EE protocol, and also lay foundation to the general problem of E2EE group video communication. We observe that the vast security literature analyzing asynchronous messaging does not translate well to synchronous video calls. Namely, while strong forms of forward secrecy and post compromise security are less important for (typically short-lived) video calls, various liveness properties become crucial. For example, mandating that participants quickly learn of updates to the meeting roster and key, media streams being displayed are recent, and banned participants promptly lose any access to the meeting. Our main results are as follows: 1.Propose a new notion of leader-based continuous group key agreement with liveness, which accurately captures the E2EE properties specific to the synchronous communication scenario.2.Prove security of the core of Zoom’s E2EE meetings protocol in the above well-defined model.3.Propose ways to strengthen Zoom’s liveness properties by simple modifications to the original protocol, which have since been deployed in production.
AB - In May 2020, Zoom Video Communications, Inc. (Zoom) announced a multi-step plan to comprehensively support end-to-end encrypted (E2EE) group video calls and subsequently rolled out basic E2EE support to customers in October 2020. In this work we provide the first formal security analysis of Zoom’s E2EE protocol, and also lay foundation to the general problem of E2EE group video communication. We observe that the vast security literature analyzing asynchronous messaging does not translate well to synchronous video calls. Namely, while strong forms of forward secrecy and post compromise security are less important for (typically short-lived) video calls, various liveness properties become crucial. For example, mandating that participants quickly learn of updates to the meeting roster and key, media streams being displayed are recent, and banned participants promptly lose any access to the meeting. Our main results are as follows: 1.Propose a new notion of leader-based continuous group key agreement with liveness, which accurately captures the E2EE properties specific to the synchronous communication scenario.2.Prove security of the core of Zoom’s E2EE meetings protocol in the above well-defined model.3.Propose ways to strengthen Zoom’s liveness properties by simple modifications to the original protocol, which have since been deployed in production.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85161441139&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_6
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-30589-4_6
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85161441139
SN - 9783031305887
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 157
EP - 189
BT - Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2023 - 42nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Proceedings
A2 - Hazay, Carmit
A2 - Stam, Martijn
PB - Springer Science and Business Media Deutschland GmbH
Y2 - 23 April 2023 through 27 April 2023
ER -