Endogenous election timing in majoritarian parliamentary systems

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)85-110
    Number of pages26
    JournalEconomics and Politics
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - 1996

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics


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