Entropy and the value of information for investors

Antonio Cabrales, Olivier Gossner, Roberto Serrano

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Consider an investor who fears ruin when facing investments that satisfy no-arbitrage. Before investing he can purchase information about the state of nature as an information structure. Given his prior, information structure α investment dominates information structure β if, whenever he is willing to buy β at some price, he is also willing to buy α at that price. We show that this informativeness ordering is complete and is represented by the decrease in entropy of his beliefs, regardless of his preferences, initial wealth, or investment problem. We also show that no prior-independent informativeness ordering based on similar premises exists.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)360-377
Number of pages18
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume103
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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