TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium binding agreements
AU - Ray, Debraj
AU - Vohra, Rajiv
N1 - Funding Information:
* We thank Francis Bloch, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Andreu Mas-Colell, Paul Milgrom, Bezalel Peleg, Robert Rosenthal, Roberto Serrano, Sang-Seung Yi, and an anonymous referee for useful comments. We gratefully acknowledge support under National Science Foundation Grants SBR-9414114 [Ray] and SBR-9414142 [Vohra]. Partial assistance under Grant PB90-0172 from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia, Government of Spain [Ray], and a Fulbright Research Award [Vohra] also supported this research. An earlier version of this paper was circulated as Working Paper 92 8, Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912.
PY - 1997/3
Y1 - 1997/3
N2 - We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71.
AB - We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A solution concept and its applications are discussed.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C71.
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2236
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2236
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031094130
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 73
SP - 30
EP - 78
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -