@article{4ef05cce3c144cf58b4d53602972955e,
title = "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games",
abstract = "This paper provides a novel existence theorem for subgame perfect equilibria of potentially large extensive form games with perfect information and continuous preferences, allowing for infinite horizon and infinite action spaces. The approach is based on the properties of the topology on the space of outcomes and differs from all previous approaches in the literature. Furthermore, the existence proof relies on a new algorithm that is independent of the horizon, hence can also be applied to infinite-horizon games.",
keywords = "Backwards induction, Equilibrium existence, Large extensive form games, Perfect information, Subgame perfection",
author = "Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger",
note = "Funding Information: The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by three anonymous referees, Larry Blume, Egbert Dierker, Michael Greinecker, Josef Hofbauer, Johannes Kern, Martin Meier, Karl Schlag, and Walter Trockel, by seminar participants at Cornell, Princeton, and Yale University, and at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, by participants in a semi-plenary session at the World Congress of the Game Theory Society 2012, and by participants at the Workshop in honor of Harold Kuhn in Vienna 2012. We also thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) for financial support under projects Al-1169/1 and I338-G16, respectively. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier B.V.. Copyright: Copyright 2020 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2016",
month = jan,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "62",
pages = "5--18",
journal = "Journal of Mathematical Economics",
issn = "0304-4068",
publisher = "Elsevier",
}